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Not withered on the vine: The need for surrogacy law reform 
1. Introduction 
Surrogacy is an arrangement in which, by mutual consent prior to conception, one woman 
(the surrogate), becomes pregnant, carries and gives birth to a child or children on behalf of 
others who intend to be the parent(s) (µthe intended parent(s)¶ (IPs)). Though the terminology 
used to describe the participants varies, and can be contentious, essentially, all surrogacy 
DUUDQJHPHQWV IDOO LQWR RQH RI WZR W\SHV µ)XOO¶ µKRVW¶ µFDUULHU¶ µJHVWDWLRQDO¶ RU µ,9)¶ 
surrogacy occurs where the surrogate is genetically unrelated to the child she carries (i.e. she 
LVLPSODQWHGZLWKDQHPEU\RFUHDWHGE\PL[LQJRWKHUV¶ egg and sperm, often but not always 
those of the IPs). Clearly, such arrangements require clinical LQYROYHPHQW µ3DUWLDO¶ or 
µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ VXUURJDF\ RFFXUV ZKHUH WKH VXUURJDWH¶V RZQ HJJ LV XVHG VR VKH LV DOVR
genetically related to any resulting child(ren)). Somewhat confusingly this form of surrogacy 
KDVDOVREHHQFDOOHGµJHQHWLF¶µFRPSOHWH¶µVWUDLJKW¶RUµJHQHWLF-JHVWDWLRQDO¶VXUURJDF\. While 
this may involve clinical expertise, LWGRHVQ¶WKDYHWRpregnancy can be established via self-
insemination. 
In the last decade or so, surrogacy has re-HPHUJHGDVµFRQWURYHUVLDO¶ODUJHO\DVDUHVXOWRIWKH
ULVH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO RU µFURVV-ERUGHU¶ VXUURJDF\ DUUDQJHPHQWV PRVW RI ZKLFK DUH
commercial in nature. This has driven television and news media, the family courts, and 
wider legal questions,1 as well as piquing academic ± and potentially regulatory ± interest.2 
The internet-fuelled modern phenomenon of international surrogacy has heightened and 
renewed interest in how surrogacy is and should be regulated in both the UK and elsewhere.3 
                                                          
1
 Including human rights issues, see e.g. Mennesson v. France (ECHR June 2014). 
2
 The Law Commission has recently closed its consultation on its thirteenth programme of law reform (31 
October 2016), in which it asked whether it should consider surrogacy 
(http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/surrogacy/www.lawcom.gov.uk/surrogacy/ accessed 1 November 2016). 
3
 K. Horsey K., and/S. Sheldon, S., µ6WLOO+D]\$IWHU$OO7KHVH<HDUV7KH/DZ5HJXODWLQJ6XUURJDF\¶ (2012), 
Medical Law Review 20: (2012), 67; also E. Jackson, E., this volume at XX. Some commentators suggest 
international regulation ± see C. Rogerson, C., this volume at XX. See also the work of the Permanent Bureau of 
The Hague Convention on Private International Law (HCCH) Parentage and Surrogacy Project - 
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy. However, universal agreement is 
unlikely to be easily achieved ± see e.g. A. Blackburn-Starza, A., µ&RXQFLORI(XURSHUHMHFWVVXUURJDF\
JXLGHOLQHV¶BioNews 873,  (17 October 2016.). 
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In the UK, a flurry of cases over the last 8-10 years has resulted predominantly from 
internationalised or cross-border surrogacy arrangements. A number of these have challenged 
the sanctity or legitimacy of the existing rules surrounding the transfer of legal parenthood 
and/or the prohibition on (commercial) payments. 
µ'RPHVWLF¶FDVHVDOVRshow how even those entering non-international arrangements suffer, 
because surrogacy law remains µhazy¶4 This statement is supported by a report published in 
November 2015, which included the results of a survey to which 111 surrogates and 206 IPs 
responded.5 Taken together, the case law and survey responses illustrate that surrogacy law in 
the UK is no longer fit for purpose. This article contends that, having been crafted in 1985 
under different prevailing conditions and being based on assumptions that are no longer 
tenable, it is time to repeal the Surrogacy Arrangements Act (as well as the related provisions 
in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008) and start again with surrogacy. 
'HPDQG IRU VXUURJDF\FOHDUO\GLGQRW µZLWKHURQ WKHYLQH¶ DV WKH majority of the Warnock 
Committee hoped.6 There is now a pressing need for new legislation that is able to cope with 
the demands of 21st century surrogacy, which must be empirically grounded, facilitative and 
able to sensibly and sensitively encompass the increased use of international arrangements. 
2. 6XUURJDF\¶VKLVWRU\DVRFLDODQGOHJDORYHUYLHZ 
The first surrogacy cases in the UK emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, before any 
statutory guidance existed. Judicial disapproval of the practice was evident from the language 
used in judgments WR GHVFULEH VXUURJDF\ DUUDQJHPHQWV ZKLFK ZHUH VHHQ DV µLPPRUDO¶
µEL]DUUHDQGXQQDWXUDO¶µVRUGLGFRPPHUFLDOEDUJDLQV¶DJUHHPHQWVWRµVHOODFKLOG¶DQGµDNLQG
of baby-farming operation of a wholly distasteful and lamentable kind¶.7 Even where no 
dispute arose between the parties, the state expressed concern for child welfare (Re C (a 
                                                          
4
 Horsey and /Sheldon, ibid,µ6WLOO+D]\$IWHU$OO7KHVH<HDUV¶ (n. 3), also see most recently A B and C 
(UK surrogacy expenses) [2016] EWFC 33; Z (surrogacy agreements: Child arrangement orders) [2016] 
EWFC 34; CD v. EF and AB (2016) EWHC 2643. 
5
 K. Horsey, K., µ6XUURJDF\LQWKH8.0\WKEXVWLQJDQGUHIRUP¶, Report of the Surrogacy UK Working Group 
on Surrogacy Law Reform (Surrogacy UK, November 2015). 
6
 Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation, Report of the 
Review Team &P/RQGRQ+062µWKH%UD]LHU5HSRUW¶para. 2.23, and M. Brazier, M., 
µ5HJXODWLQJWKH5HSURGXFWLRQ%XVLQHVV"¶ (1999), Medical Law Review 166, at (1999), 180. 
7




minor) [1985]).8 The notorious American Baby M case leadled to further concerns about 
surrogacy¶V potential for exploitation of women.9 In that case a young single woman entered 
a surrogacy contract with a wealthy couple. Later, following disagreements, she ZHQWµRQthe 
UXQ¶ZLWK the baby, only to later have the surrogacy contract enforced against her in a blaze of 
publicity. 
A case like Baby M could only fuel the fire that was already growing in the anti-surrogacy 
community, particularly among many radical feminists who saw surrogacy as a patriarchal 
DWWHPSW WR JDLQ FRQWURO RYHU ZRPHQ¶V UHSURGXFWLYH SURFHVVHV, exploitative of women and 
commodifying women, children and/or reproduction. Some likened surrogacy to 
prostitution,10 or even slavery,11 and it is probably no coincidence that MargareW $WZRRG¶V
futuristic dystopia µ7KH+DQGPDLG¶V7DOH¶Tale was first published in 1985. 
In 1982 the British government commissioned a Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Mary 
Warnock, a respected moral philosopher, to consider the implications of (then still new) IVF 
technology and related aspects of fertility treatment (including the use of gamete donors and 
surrogacy) and the emerging science of embryology.12 The Warnock Committee concluded 
                                                          
8
 [1985] FLR 846 and see K. Cotton, K., this volume, at XX. 
9
 Baby M, In the matter of (1988) 537 A 2d 1227. 
10
 For example, G. Corea, G., µ7KH5HSURGXFWLYH%URWKHO¶, in G. Corea (ed.).), Man Made Women: How New 
Reproductive Technologies Affect Women (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987):), 38 
WKHWHUPµUHSURGXFWLYHEURWKHO¶RULJLQDWHGZLWK$QGUHD'ZRUNLQLQKHUERRNRight Wing Women (London: 
:RPHQ¶V3UHVV; Pollit, K.,. Pollit, Reasonable Creatures: Essays on Women and Feminism (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995):), 69; T. Shannon, T., Surrogate Motherhood: The Ethics of Using Human Beings (New 
York: Crossroad Publishing, 1988):), 152. 
11
 Mary Lyndon Shanley comSDUHVVXUURJDF\WRµFRQWUDFWVIRUFRQVHQVXDOVODYHU\¶LQµ¶6XUURJDWH
0RWKHULQJ¶µ³Surrogate Mothering´ DQG:RPHQ¶V)UHHGRP$&ULWLTXHRI&RQWUDFWVIRU+XPDQ5HSURGXFWLRQ¶ , 
in P. Boling, P., (ed.), Expecting Trouble: Surrogacy, Fetal Abuse and New Reproductive Technologies 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1995):), 165. 
12
 Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, Report Cmnd 9314 (1984) (London: HMSO) 
µWKH:DUQRFN5HSRUW¶SHH0DU\:DUQRFN¶V)RUHZRUGWRWKLVYROXPH for reflections on the findings of this 
Inquiry in relation to surrogacy. 
 





that relationships between mother and child become distorted when a woman becomes 
pregnant in order to carry a child she will give away and recommended that both commercial 
and non-profit agencies be prohibited, and that all participants in surrogacy arrangements 
should be criminalised, other than the surrogate and the IPs (in order for the child to avoid the 
µWDLQW RI FULPLQDOLW\¶13 It also said that all surrogacy arrangements should be void and 
unenforceable.14 A dissenting minority distanced themselves from the main recommendations 
on surrogacy, saying instead that the practice ± which could greatly benefit some infertile 
couples, and on the basis that demand for it would not go away ± should be regulated and 
provided by licensed surrogacy agencies: µWKH GRRUVKRXOGEHOHIWDMDU¶.15 
Some of Warnock's recommendations on surrogacy were acted on almost immediately. The 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act (SAA) 1985 followed soon after the report and ± over 30 years 
later ± is still in force. Agencies or brokers operating on a commercial basis have been 
banned in the UK since the SAA which, based on the :DUQRFN &RPPLWWHH¶V
recommendations, also made it illegal to advertise for or as a surrogate. No criminal offence 
is imposed on the actual participants, reflecting the CRPPLWWHH¶V YLHZ WKDW WKLV ZRXOG EH
better for the children born from surrogacy arrangements. Thus, the SAA neither prohibits 
nor facilitates surrogacy; however the legal vulnerability perpetuated by the Act can be seen 
as intending to discourage surrogacy arrangements. 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990 inserted a provision into the SAA 
rendering all aspects of surrogacy arrangements unenforceable. No one is granted legal rights 
by a surrogacy agreement. IPs cannot therefore sue for performance or damages if the 
surrogate changes her mind, and nor can she have any remedy against them if they renege. 
2Q WRS RI WKH 6$$¶V FULPLQDO SURYLVLRQV the HFE Act defined who the legal mother and 
father of children would be born following assisted conception procedures. In most cases, as 
explored below, legal parenthood becomes automatically vested in those who will raise the 
child, whether or not there is a genetic connection, though this is not the case for surrogacy. 
The Act established a process under which legal parenthood could be transferred to IPs from 
the surrogate (and her spouse/partner, if there is one), providing they meet certain criteria, via 
                                                          
13
 Warnock Report, para. 8.18. 
14
 ibidIbid., para. 8.19. 
15
 Warnock Report, Expression of Dissent A: Surrogacy. 
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a parental order (PO).16 This stemmed from a late amendment to the Bill, added by an MP 
who was approached by constituents objecting to having to adopt their own genetic baby. 
0RUHUHFHQWO\WKHVHµVWDWXVSURYLVLRQV¶± including the PO mechanism ± were updated by the 
HFE Act 2008 following minimal public consultation. Though this means that the correct 
people can eventually be legally recognised as the parents, the very existence of such an order 
has the effect of reinforcing underlying presumptions that the surrogate should be the legal 
mother of the child and therefore that surrogacy arrangements are about taking babies away 
from mothers, rather than women helping others become parents.17 This means that surrogacy 
is treated in law largely as a version of adoption, rather than a form of assisted conception. 
Interestingly, however, in the 2015 survey referred to above, only four of the surrogate 
respondents said that the law is correct in identifying them as the legal mother at birth.18 
The government last concerned itself with surrogacy in the context of payments. In 1997 
Professor Margaret Brazier chaired a further inquiry into surrogacy.19 There appeared to be 
no question of the correctness of banning commercial agencies and preventing advertising. 
The then new Labour government worried about seemingly ever-increasing payments being 
made to surrogates which, despite limitations on commercialism, were becoming increasingly 
high.20 +RZHYHU GHVSLWH WKDW&RPPLWWHH¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\ LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH
expenses that might legitimately be paid to surrogates, no further legislative change occurred. 
The Brazier Report confirmed that Warnock¶V recommendations were based on the 
assumption, held by the majority of the Committee, that surrogacy was exploitative:21 
                                                          
16
 These provisions are now contained in the HFE Act 2008, s54s. 54. 
17
 K. Horsey, K., µ&KDOOHQJLQJSUHVXPSWLRQVOHJDOSDUHQWKRRGDQGVXUURJDF\DUUDQJHPHQWV¶  (2010), Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 4: (2010), 449. See also N. Gamble, N., and/H. Prosser, H., this volume, at XX. 
18
 $IXUWKHUµVDLGDFOHDU³QR´WRDTXHVWLRQDVNLQJZKHWKHUWKHVXUURJDWHVKRXOGKDYHWKHULJKWWRFKDQJHKHU
PLQGDERXWJLYLQJWKHEDE\WRWKH,3V¶+RUVH\noteµSurrogacy in the UK¶ 2015 (n. 5 above,), 21. 
19
 Note 6, above. 
20
 Expenses payments in this country are still not exorbitant. The 2015 survey responses showed that the 
majority of surrogates in the UK (68.2%) reported receiving between £10,000 and £15,000, with none receiving 
more than £20,000. The IPs in the survey reported paying £0 to £25,000 to the surrogates they used with the 
average payment being £10,859 (Horsey, noteµSurrogacy in the UK¶ 2015 (n. 5 above,), 20;, 23). 
21
 Brazier Report, Parapara. 2.4-2.6. The Warnock Report had certainly had little positive to say about 
VXUURJDF\VWDWLQJWKDWLIµDZRPDQGHOLEHUDWHO\DOORZVKHUVHOIWREHFRPHSUHJQDQWZLWKWKHLQWHQWLRQRIJLYLQJ
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µWKH FOHDU REMHFWLYH RI WKRVH >:DUQRFN¶V@ SURSRVDOV ZDV WR LPSOHPHQW D OHJLVODWLYH
framework which strongly discouraged surrogacy arrangements, made transparent 
VRFLHW\¶V GLVDSSURYDO RI VXUURJDF\ DV D SUDFWLFH DQG OLPLWHG UHVRUW WR VXUURJDF\
arrangements to, at most, a handful of instances where a relative or close friend would 
DJUHHWRDFWDVDVXUURJDWHRQDQDOWUXLVWLFEDVLV¶22 
In other words, the Warnock PDMRULW\WDNLQJDµPRUDOLVWLFSDWHUQDOLVWLF¶VWDQFH23 hoped that 
strict regulation, particularly of the commercial aspects of surrogacy, would cause the 
SUDFWLFHRIVXUURJDF\WRµZLWKHURQWKHYLQH¶ 
Brazier recommended that only limited payments to surrogates ± LQ WKH IRUPRI µMXVWLILDEOH
H[SHQVHV¶ ± should be allowed.24 Justifiable expenses included such things as maternity 
clothing, healthy food, travel expenses, counselling, insurances, medical tests and procedures 
± and should be evidenced by receipts or other documentation. The Brazier Report ultimately 
also recommended that surrogacy should continue to be discouraged but recognised that 
µVXUURJDF\ VKRXOG UHPDLQ DQ RSWLRQ RI ODVW UHVRUW DYDLODEOH RQO\ WR FRXSOHV ZKHUH WKH
LQWHQGLQJPRWKHU¶VFRQGLWLRQUHQGHUVSUHJQDQF\LPSRVVLEOHRUKLJKO\GDQJHURXVWRKHU¶25 To 
facilitate this, the report recommended repeal of the SAA and surrogacy-related provisions of 
the 1990 HFE Act, followed by the creation of a new Surrogacy Act. However, despite the 
so-called pressing need to reconsider surrogacy, nothing was done following the Report: none 
of its recommendations were acted upon. And, even when the opportunity arose to fully re-
examine the law relating to surrogacy in the context of a wider review of the 1990 Act in 
2005-72007, little happened. By this time, as has been argued elsewhere, surrogacy had been 
µVZHSWXQGHUWKHFDUSHW¶.26 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
XSWKHFKLOGWRZKLFKVKHZLOOJLYHELUWK«LVWKHZURQJZD\WRDSSURDFKSUHJQDQF\¶ para. 8.11). This is also 
admitted by Mary Warnock in her Foreword to this volume, at XX. 
22
 Brazier Report, Parapara. 2.11 
23
 0LFKDHO)UHHPDQµ,V6XUURJDF\([SORLWDWLYH"¶, in Sheila McLean (ed.).), Legal Issues in Human 
Reproduction (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1989):), 166. 
24
 Ibid paraparas. 5.24 ± ±5.25. 
25
 Ibid para. 8.9. 
26
 K. Horsey, K., µ6ZHSW8QGHUWKH&DUSHW:K\6XUURJDF\/DZ1HHGV8UJHQW5HYLHZ¶ , in: N. Priaulx, N. 
and/A. Wrigley, A.  (eds. (2013).), Ethics, Law and Society: Vol, vol. 5 (Ashgate, 2013). 
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In 2005 the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee recommended that the 
Government should include within its review of the 1990 Act an assessment of surrogacy 
arrangements, taking the Brazier Report as a starting point and considering all developments 
since 1998. It further recommended that consideration should be given to introducing 
separate legislation covering surrogacy. One would have hoped that, in order to achieve this, 
detailed attention would be paid to all aspects of surrogacy and its regulation.27 
Though the Department of Health subsequently undertook a supposedly comprehensive 
review of the law on assisted reproduction and embryology WRPDNHLWµILWIRUSXUSRVH¶LQ the 
21st century,28 on surrogacy, its consultation document asked merely µwhat, if any, changes 
DUHQHHGHGWRWKHODZDQGUHJXODWLRQDVLWUHODWHVWRVXUURJDF\¶. It asked whether, if changes 
were deemed necessary, these should follow Brazier¶V recommendations and/or be dealt with 
in separate legislation outside the review. Again apparently there was no doubt that the 
approach taken against commercialism, agencies or advertising was correct: no specific 
questions were asked about the basic regulation of surrogacy ± or the moral or other 
justifications for it. A further question related to legal parenthood but was limited in scope 
and seemingly included only because it FRXOGQ¶W be omitted in the context of the other 
changes that would have to be made to parent µVWDWXVSURYLVLRQV¶ LQDSRVW-civil partnership 
era. No consideration was given at all to the then emerging international surrogacy 
marketplace, or the issues that this might generate. 
2.1 Changing Attitudes 
Since the 1980s, social, media, judicial and medical representations of surrogacy changed, 
largely positively. The language used by judges became less disapproving. The British 
Medical Association changed its stance on surrogacy (in 1996 it officially recognised 
VXUURJDF\ DV µDQ DFFHSWDEOH RSWLRQ RI ODVW UHsRUW¶ as did the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, as evidenced by successive Codes of Practice. More fertility clinics 
became willing to facilitate surrogacy arrangements. Cases seem largely to have raised 
                                                          
27
 In the same year, the Irish Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction (CAHR) had recommended ± in the 
context of a wholesale absence of regulation of ART in Ireland ± that surrogacy should be allowed, but 
regulated in order to protect participants, and that parenthood following surrogacy should be based on  intention, 
as it would also be for parents using donated gametes or embryos (CAHR 2005, 52-53). 
28
 Department of Health, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: A Public Consultation (DoH, 
London 2005). 
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questions about retrospective authorisations of expenses, and increasingly to be about 
navigating the hazy technicalities of legal parenthood. Surrogates were presented mostly as 
ZRPHQ GRLQJ µD JRRG WKLQJ¶ E\ PDLQVWUHDP PHGLD HYHQ ZKHUH WKH\ UHFHLYHG PRQH\ IRU
doing so. Since the early 1990s all major British soap operas have featured at least one 
surrogacy storyline, as did Friends, a high-profile and very popular comedy series from the 
US. Surrogacy also gained its own µcelebrity status¶, being used by Sir Elton John and his 
partner David Furnish, as well as Nicole Kidman, Robert de Niro, Sarah Jessica Parker, 
Christiano Ronaldo, Neil Patrick Harris, Tyra Banks and Lucy Liu, among others. One blog 
commentator ± herself a surrogate ± describes hoZ WKH FHOHEULW\ µWUHQG¶ for surrogacy has 
helped to normalise it and how modern UHSRUWLQJLVµRIWHQV\PSDWKHWLFDQGDOWUXLVWLFUDWKHU
WKDQSXUHO\VHQVDWLRQDOLVWLFDQGVRSXEOLFRSLQLRQIROORZV¶.29  
Nowadays, some fairly large-scale non-commercial agencies exist and, as they offer services 
on a not-for-profit basis, are able to facilitate arrangements between commissioning parents 
and surrogates, as well as provide a source of support for all those involved.30 Given the 
nature of the relationship between surrogates, potential parents and agencies in the UK, it is 
unsurprising that studies have shown that it is altruism that motivates the majority of 
surrogates.31 Very few disputes ± that is, where a surrogate changed her mind and decided to 
keep the baby she carried ± have ever been documented.32 The oldest surrogacy agency 
operating in the UK, COTS, estimates that less than five per cent5% of arrangements break 
down (and not all of these will be after pregnancy is established). In fact, evidence shows that 
the majority of surrogates in the UK (94.3%) stay in touch with the families they helped 
create, and that there is a high level of openness between IPs and their children about the 
method of their conception.33 Very rarely does a worrying case emerge, for example 
                                                          
29
 µ-R¶, µ6XUURJDF\µWUHQG¶³WUHQG´ for cHOHEULWLHV¶, UK Surrogacy Support,  (19 March 2012,), 
http://uksurrogacysupport.com/surrogacy-trend-celebrities/ (accessed 25 October 2016). 
30
 See Cotton, this volume, at XX; Smith, this volume, at XX; Gamble and /Prosser, this volume, at XX. 
31
 V. Jadva, V., this volume, also see Horsey, note 13 above. 
32
 N. Gamble, N., and/H. Prosser, H., this volume, identify only five reported dispute cases (at XX), and these 
are not all cases where the surrogate changed her mind. 
33
 Horsey, noteµSurrogacy in the UK¶ 2015 (n. 5 above,), 20;, 22. Also see V. Jadva, V., this volume. 
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concHUQLQJ WKH VXUURJDWH¶V bodily autonomy or the behaviour of either party.34 When one 
does, often it appears that better regulation and/or support and guidance for the participants 
might have prevented the situation. Even so, we should not overreact to the hard cases. It is 
important to bear in mind that despite the attention it receives, surrogacy is not common ± 
COTS celebrated its one thousandth baby earlier this year.35 According to CAFCASSCafcass 
figures, until a few years ago there was an average of about fifty50 POs being issued annually 
and, though this has risen in more recent years, the numbers are still in the low hundreds.36  
3. The need for legal reform 
Having outlined how surrogacy has been treated since its emergence into our legal 
consciousness over three decades ago, as well as a growing acceptance of surrogacy, the 
remainder of this article seeks to illustrate that thoughalthough surrogacy has been largely 
forgotten by regulators, it has certainly not µwithered on the vine¶. As discussed above, the 
availability and ease of obtaining international surrogates has made surrogacy more visible. If 
anything, the use of surrogacy may be on the rise, as illustrated not only by annual increases 
in the number of POs being issued but also the increased number and variety of cases 
reaching the courts. With the UK now recognising same -sex marriage, the resulting implicit 
legitimisation of gay families may lead increasing numbers of gay male couples to investigate 
surrogacy. For all these reasons, it becomes even more imperative that the law regulating 
surrogacy is revisited, to address the inadequacies we can already identify. As the Minister 
responsible for driving the 2008 Act through parliament stated: 
µGLVFXVVLRQVDERXWVXUURJDF\VKRXOGEHGHDOWZLWKHOVHZKHUe and not by amending the 
Bill, because the issues involved are complex and the debate has not been properly 
FRQVLGHUHGGXHWRLWVODWHHPHUJHQFHDVDQLVVXHLQWKH%LOO¶37 
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It must be time, now, for those discussions to begin. Here, I want to focus on one of the major 
problems (which is interlinked and overlaps with other issues, including cross-
border/international arrangements): legal parenthood and parental orders. 
3.1 Legal Parenthood and Parental Orders 
Section 33(1) of the 2008 HFE Act is clear and unequivocal about motherhood.38 The mother 
RI DQ\ FKLOG ERUQ IROORZLQJ DQ\ SURFHGXUH LV WKH ZRPDQ ZKR JLYHV ELUWK µDQG QR RWKHU
ZRPDQ¶39 The position regarding legal fatherhood is treated somewhat differently. In many 
cases, the legal recognition of the mother also determines fatherhood. Under ss35ss. 35-37 of 
the 2008 Act, if the woman who gives birth is married (to a man) when either an embryo 
FUHDWHG ZLWKRXW WKH KXVEDQG¶V VSHUP RU PL[HG JDPHWHV DUH SODFHG LQ KHU RU ZKHQ VKH
undergoes insemination ± her husband becomes the legal father. This therefore covers not 
RQO\µVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG¶,9)EXWDOVR,8,ZLWKDQGWKHXVHRIGRQDWHGVSHUP7KHVLWXDWLRQLV
the same even where treatment takes place in another country. The exception to this rule 
H[LVWVRQO\LIWKHZRPDQ¶VKXVEDQGGLGQRWFRQVHQWWRKHUEHLQJVRWUHDWHGZKLFKLQHYLWDEO\
draws its own questions about the patriarchal nature of the provisions). If she is not married, 
EXWDPDQXQGHUJRHVµWUHDWPHQWWRJHWKHU¶ZLWKKHULQOLFHQVHGSUHPLVHVKHEHFRPHVWKHOHJDO
IDWKHU $ JDS H[LVWV ZLWK UHJDUG WR PRUH µLQIRUPDO¶ LQVHPLQDWLRQSURFHGXUHV WKDW LV GR-it-
yourself inseminations which may occur outside a clinical setting.40 For a married couple, 
legal fatherhood in such situations is governed by the common law presumption of paternity 
(unless disproved) while unmarried fathers can become legal fathers only if they jointly 
register the birth with the mother. The 2008 Act mirrored the fatherhood provisions for 
female same -sex civilly -partnered couples having children using (clinical) donor 
insemination, by FUHDWLQJ WKH VWDWXV RI µ2ndsecond SDUHQW¶ for female partners of women 
undergoing licensed treatment and giving birth as a result (ss42ss. 42-44): civil partnerships 
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(and now marriage) between women are thus treated (bizarrely) the same, but differently 
IURPµWUDGLWLRQDO¶PDUULDJH, ZKLFKFDQFUHDWHDµIDWKHU¶ 
The legislative formula assigning legal parenthood following assisted reproduction works 
well for straightforward IVF and also for procedures using egg or embryo donation, as these 
techniques are used to allow a woman otherwise unable to conceive naturally (whether 
because she or her partner and infertile, or even if she is single) the ability to give birth to a 
child she intends to raise. However, when her problem is an inability to carry a child, the 
legislative position fails to recognise the social and familial reality she intends when using a 
surrogate.41 As can be seen from both the original 1990 legislation and its 2008 amendments, 
the parenthood provisions in respect of most forms of treatment correctly assign legal 
parenthood to those who intended to become parents via treatment. Therefore, we can say 
that legal parenthood, for the most part, reflects the intended social reality of the families 
created and, by doing so, the best interests of the children concerned.42 However, this is not 
the case in two situations. First, the formula works only for heterosexual couples: two women 
KDYLQJDFKLOGWRJHWKHUPD\ERWKZLVKWREHµPRWKHU¶ZKLOHWZRPHQRUDVLQJOHPDQ43 may 
prefer no-one to be so named. In non-heteronormative relationships the law then fails to 
reflect reality (and this is further compounded in relationships where the donor ± or surrogate 
± is intended by the parties to be involved in some way, perhaps as a third co-parent). 
SecondSecondly ± and of greater concern here ± in a surrogacy arrangement intention to 
become a parent only translates automatically into legal parenthood in the situation where an 
XQPDUULHG VXUURJDWH UHFHLYHV OLFHQVHG µWUHDWPHQW WRJHWKHU¶ ZLWK WKH LQWHQGHG IDWKHU. So, 
although he becomes correctly recognised as the legal father, if he has a partner, female or 
male, who also intended to be the fatherparent, only half of them can have their intention 
legally recognised. This suggests either that surrogacy is viewed aV µRWKHU¶ ± and therefore 
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potentially more dangerous ± than other ARTs, or that the fact intention does translate to 
parenthood following µQRUPDO¶ ,9) RU donor conception is serendipitous rather than 
deliberate. 
Presumably, the intention behind attaching babies to the women who carried them, whether 
RUQRWWKHUHLVDJHQHWLFFRQQHFWLRQZDVWRHQVXUHµFHUWDLQW\¶IRUVXUURJDWH-born children, as 
well as certainty that the surrogate may always change her mind. However, it might also be 
thought a deliberate attempt to delegitimise surrogacy and discourage people from entering 
VXUURJDF\ DUUDQJHPHQWV SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WKH OLJKW RI :DUQRFN¶V FRQFHUQV If one of the 
legislative goals was to offer protection to the perceived vulnerable parties (principally 
believed to be the surrogate mother and the child) then it is certainly questionable whether 
WKLV LV DFKLHYHG:KLOH WKH VXUURJDWH LV µSURWHFWHG¶ LQ WKH VHQVH WKDWFHUWDLQW\ LVPDLQWDLQHG
and, should she want to, she knows that she could keep the child, making this an absolute is 
at odds with what will usually be in the best interest of the child.44 If another goal was to 
discourage surrogacy then it is perhaps the case that some might be deterred by the provisions 
± but anecdotally at least it would appear more to be the case that ways would be sought 
around the law and this may in fact be a reason that has driven some IPs to seek surrogacy in 
other countries.45 
Given an overall view of surrogacy and why people do it, is the way legal parenthood is 
currently attributed the best way, or would other starting points be more appropriate? Two 
RWKHU SRVVLELOLWLHV HPHUJH SDUHQWKRRG IROORZV WKH JHQHWLF OLQN RU IROORZV WKH SDUWLHV¶
intentions. Both are considered here to see whether preference for that method should be 
brought into new legislation. However, doing justice to participants in surrogacy 
arrangements means that part of the consideration must be how assigning parenthood by 
either of these methods would impact across all ARTs.  
Basing legal parenthood following ART and surrogacy on the genetic link seems at first 
attractive ± SHUKDSV EHFDXVH RI RXU LQQDWH DWWUDFWLRQ WR ELRORJ\ DQG WKH µQDWXUDO¶ 4XLFNO\
however, it loses its appeal. Only one form of surrogacy (gestational) would be viable ± yet 
not always possible, and never so in the case of gay male IPs. Further, prioritising genetic 
connections simply does not work if we are to allow gamete and embryo donation. Society 
has already decided that donors should not be legal parents ± presumably given the 
responsibility that this carries, combined with the nature of and motivation for donation in the 
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first place. While we recognise that biological connections have importance, in that, for 
example, we allow those conceived using donor sperm to find out the identity of the donor 
upon reaching adulthood,46 we have not and could not merge genetics and legal parenthood 
unless we were prepared to remove conception using donors as an option for infertile people. 
On the other hand, intention has a distinct possibility as a tool for ± at least presumptively ± 
determining legal parenthood following both ARTs and surrogacy. It is not unprecedented: 
since the early 1990s a number of US states either by case law or legislation have recognised 
intentional parenthood, as does New Zealand, some Australian states and some popular 
overseas surrogacy destinations including the Ukraine and India and, via a pre-birth order, 
Greece. In 2005 ,UHODQG¶V CAHR recommended that parenthood following ART should be 
presumptively based on intention, as had the New Zealand Law Commission in 2004. As 
already discussed, most of the provisions in the HFE Act DOUHDG\ UHFRJQLVH WKH SDUWLHV¶
intentions, though not explicitly. Those situations where intention to become a parent is not 
so recognised ± that is, for all surrogacy (for heterosexual or gay couples, or single people) ± 
could clearly be addressed by doing so. This would be fairer, in the sense of not 
discriminating against those with a particular type of infertility or with a particular 
relationship or need. 
The 2008 changes were clearly intended to represent fairer treatment of gay and unmarried 
couples across the spectrum of assisted reproduction. However, the legislation continues to 
treat those using surrogacy differently, while no justification for this has been provided since 
Warnock. Unless there is proper justification ± which may have been the case if surrogacy 
was prone to dispute, or exploitation was rife, or there was evidence that children were in 
some way disadvantaged by being born through surrogacy ± surrogacy should be treated no 
differently from other forms of ART in respect of legal parenthood, meaning parenthood 
should automatically vest in those who intended it. Elsewhere in the law there are mirroring 
provisions. Payments, for example, are not allowed other than for reasonable expenses 
incurred for either surrogates or gamete/embryo donors. Though payments are generally 
higher in surrogacy, this is a reflection of the associated costs and length of carrying a 
pregnancy to term. Further, we allow egg-sharing to take place in licensed settings ± sharing 
eggs in return for reduction in IVF costs (which may amount to a benefit of hundreds if not 
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thousands of pounds) does not impact on the recognition of parenthood, which still follows 
intent. Failing this, intent could be partially recognised by the operation of a pre-birth process 
which comes into effect at birth to immediately transfer legal parenthood to the IPs. Not only 
would this mean that the correct people were recognised, it would reflect the views and 
feelings held by the majority of surrogates and IPs, and potentially avoid other problems like 
non-recognition or poor treatment of IPs by hospital staff or, for example, issues regarding 
consent to treatment of a new-born infant.47 
3.1.12 Parental Orders 
There are many problems with the PO process. First, it is not compulsory to apply for an 
order, and a number of IPs do not, have not or choose not to apply.48 In 2016, 
CAFCASSCafcass ran a campaign to raise awareness of the need to apply for a PO, having 
identified this as a problem. Further, some people cannot apply for an order as they are 
ineligible. This does not prevent them using surrogacy, only from being legally recognised as 
the parents of their children (who often may be genetically related),) without adopting. At the 
very least, this different treatment of different groups of people is a reason that the system 
should be questioned. Some further reasons are considered here. 
Upon the granting of an order, legal parenthood is transferred to the IPs, should they be lucky 
enough to fit within the tight parameters required by the legislation. In the 2008 Act, the 
qualifying criteria were extended to include unmarried couples in undefined µHQGXULQJfamily 
relationships¶ and same sex partnerships either civilly partnered or in such an enduring 
relationship. As under the 1990 Act, at least one party must be genetically related to the child 
and the child must reside with the couple, either or both of whom must be domiciled in the 
UK. Unconditional agreement from the surrogate and any other parent must be received, but 
this can only be given after six weeks but before six months following the birth of the child 
(giving a wholly XQQHFHVVDU\JUDFHSHULRGJLYHQWKHVXUURJDWH¶VXOWLPDWHULJKWRIYHWRLQDQ\
case).49 In granting an order, a µFRXUt must be satisfied that no money or other benefit (other 
                                                          
47
 6HHµ1+6KRVSLWDOVIRUFLQJ VXUURJDWHIDPLOLHVWRKDQGRYHUQHZERUQEDELHVLQFDUSDUNVGXHWRµGLUHDQG
RXWGDWHG¶ODZV¶, The Independent,  (29 October 2016.). 
48
 Horsey, K., note µSurrogacy in the UK¶ 2015 (n. 5 above, at), XX. See also Jackson et al,., note XX 40 above. 
49
 It is now arguable whether the six-month time limit exists at all, given judicial extensions of the timeframe 
undertaken in the best interests of the children (see e.g. Re X (a child) (surrogacy: time limit) [2014] EWHC 
Commented [SL12]: ŽĞƐƚŚĞ ?:ĂĐŬƐŽŶĞƚĂů ? ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŵĞĂŶ
footnote 57? If so please swop short and long references. Or do you 





WKDQIRUH[SHQVHVUHDVRQDEO\LQFXUUHGKDVEHHQJLYHQRUUHFHLYHG¶ In practice, the process of 
gaining a PO can take many months, leading to a real-world concern. If the child resides with 
the IPs then unless and until an order is made the people caring for the child are not legally 
responsible and have no decision-making authority, while the surrogate (and potentially her 
partner) remains both financially and legally responsible. 
Extending the categories of people who may apply for POs looks progressive on the face of 
it. Section 54 is an improvement on the 1990 Act, which specified that POs were available 
only to married couples ± WKH H[WHQVLRQ WR FLYLO SDUWQHUV DQG WKRVH LQ µHQGXULQJ IDPLO\
relatLRQVKLSV¶ LVZHOFRPHEXWGid not go far enough in terms of providing equal legislative 
treatment. 6HFWLRQ  EHJLQV µ2Q DQ DSSOLFDWLRQ PDGH E\ WZR SHRSOH«¶ This exclusion of 
single applicants has recently been subject to a human rights challenge, resulting in a 
declaration of incompatibility, which the government must now address.50 This would 
provide the perfect opportunity or springboard from which to review the rest of the law. In 
any case, the provision does not prevent single people entering surrogacy arrangements (if 
this was the intention), it just prevents children from having their (single) parent properly 
recognised, which surely cannot be in their best interests. It also entirely fails to take into 
account what might happen if a couple either separates or one partner dies during the course 
of the surrogacy or parenthood transfer process.51 +RZLVWKLVLQDFKLOG¶VEHVWLQWHUHVW?  
The fact that one of the couple must be genetically related to be able to qualify for PO seems 
also to place an unnecessary barrier in the path of a minority of people seeking parenthood 
via surrogacy. While not usually being a problem, given who uses surrogacy and why, what 
about couples who require a donated embryo? Or if both partners in a same sex relationship 
were infertile (or even if they agreed that neither of them would be a genetic parent)? Given 
that other aspects of the parenthood provisions in the Act deprioritise the genetic link (such 
as in relation to donors), how is this tenable? 
As already mentioned, despite s54s. 54 deeming a parental order impossible if payments 
EH\RQG µUHDVRQDEOH H[SHQVHV¶ DUH PDGH WKH FRXUWV KDYH D IDLUO\ ORQJ KLVWRU\ RI
retrospectively authorising payments that could be viewed as breaking this provision, where 
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it would be in the best interest of the child to grant an order. This is largely to do with 
UHFRJQLVLQJ WKH VWDWXV TXR DQG DYRLGLQJ GLVUXSWLRQ LQ D FKLOG¶V VHWWOHG OLIH ZLWK WKH
commissioning parents. What is the alternative? It would seem axiomatic that the refusal to 
grant an order on this basis would merely place the child into further uncertainty about their 
home life and the legal status of those bringing them up. Enforced return to the surrogate is 
not an option, leaving only the possibility of adoption or care. Retrospective authorisation of 
larger sums of money changing hands seems to be a continuing trend.52 As some judges have 
identified ± in the best interests of the children concerned, what else could they do?53 
Unlike adoption orders, POs cannot be given without the consent of the surrogate (within the 
timeframe outlined above) even if unreasonably withheld.54 If a court finds, despite a 
withdrawal of consent, WKDW LW ZRXOG EH LQ WKH FKLOG¶V EHVW LQWHUHVWV WR be with the 
commissioning parents, it is possible that an order might still be made.55 This raises some 
problems that could be avoided with parenthood presumptively following intent. For 
example, in Re D and L [2012], a parental order was authorised despite not being able to get 
the VXUURJDWH¶VFRQVHQWVKHFRXOGQ¶WEHIRXQG56 While this case also serves to illustrate the 
MHRSDUG\WKDWPD\EHIDFHGE\VRPHFRPPLVVLRQLQJSDUHQWVLWDOVRKLJKOLJKWVWKHVXUURJDWH¶V
clear intention not to be involved with the child. 
Conclusion 
Surrogacy in the UK is imperfectly restricted rather than being properly and safely regulated. 
What law there is was designed in the 1980s to discourage surrogacy and was founded on the 
twin assumptions that that agreements would go wrong, and that the surrogacy involves 
exploitation and taking babies from their mothers. Since then, the law has been modified 
without much thought. Given the power of the Internetinternet and the ever-growing, ever-
changing international surrogacy industry, that objective is now completely obsolete. People 
who want a child through surrogacy ± especially but not limited to those who can afford it ± 
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will have one.57 Medical tourism is on the rise more generally and ART, including surrogacy, 
is not excluded. People have many reasons for entering this type of arrangement including 
easier and faster access to treatment, which is often facilitated by the ability to pay, coupled 
with the ease of finding a surrogate and the certainty that the agreement will result in a 
baby.58 However, cross-border surrogacy brings its own problems. It would be preferable to 
have a more facilitative domestic legal regime that recognises surrogacy asfor what it is: 
women helping others to create their families. Perhaps, then, fewer parents would need to 
travel abroad to countries where medical procedures may be less safe, the laws relating to 
birth registration and citizenship may conflict with ours, leaving children and parents legally 
vulnerable and surrogates may not be adequately protected from exploitation. 
The biggest part of the reform needed is in relation to legal parenthood following surrogacy. 
This needs thorough review, including reconsideration of both the process and the criteria 
upon which parenthood is awarded. Overall, the problems raised by POs and in particular the 
increasing levels of judicial dissatisfaction with the application of the criteria for awarding 
them, suggest that a post-birth order is not necessarily the best way to determine parenthood 
following surrogacy. It should be the IPs who register the birth of their child(ren) and have 
legal responsibility and obligations to them from the moment of birth. The voices of 
surrogates and IPs should be heard on this: surrogates do not view themselves as mothers, 
while IPs generally invest in parenthood as much as, if not more than, other parents. 
Psychologically, they are parents from the moment of conception. Consideration should 
therefore be given to reversing the presumption that the surrogate is the mother or, if this is 
deemed untenable, to establishing a pre-birth process which leads to the recognition of the 
IPs as legal parents at birth where everyone continues to agree. 
The existing law on payments is confused and ineffective: there is no clarity about what 
'reasonable expenses' means. High Court judges are prepared to circumvent the rules even 
when they view expenses paid as being beyond reasonable. Questions about payments come 
too late in any case: after the child is born, and usually by the time it is being cared for by 
those who made the payments, with responsibility abdicated (though not legally) by those 
who received them - child welfare must (and does) take priority. Thus, as well as changing 
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the way legal parenthood is recognised following surrogacy, it is time to review what 
expenses may be considered µUHDVRQDEOH¶ 
